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I
n the spring of 2004, there was widespread expectation in financial
markets that the Federal Reserve would shortly begin the process of
raising its federal funds rate target back toward a more normal level.
At the time, there was considerable concern that removing policy
accommodation could lead to a sharp rise in long-term interest rates
that might roil financial markets or slow the economic recovery. Much
of this concern was based on the sizable increases in long-term rates that
occurred when the Federal Reserve tightened policy in 1994-95 and
1999-2000. 
In contrast to the conventional wisdom, however, longer-term rates
actually declined as the funds rate target rose. Indeed, in August 2005,
after the Federal Reserve had raised its federal funds rate target from 1
percent to 3
1⁄2 percent, the yield on the benchmark 10-year Treasury
note remained below its level at the onset of policy tightening. This sur-
prising behavior of long-term rates has been labeled a “conundrum” by
Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan and many financial market partic-
ipants, and considerable effort has been made to understand the causes
of the conundrum and its implications for monetary policy.
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5This article provides a framework for understanding the relation-
ship between monetary policy and the yield curve that can be used to
analyze the behavior of long-term rates during periods of monetary
policy tightening. This framework is used to examine two recent
episodes of policy tightening, in 1999-2000 and 2004-05. The analysis
reveals that the conundrum period is highly unusual, but it also suggests
that the relationship between monetary policy and the yield curve is
quite complex and highly variable over time.
The first section of the article compares the relationship between
the yield curve and monetary policy across nine episodes of monetary
policy tightening over the past 40 years, highlighting patterns in this
relationship that are common to all nine episodes. The second section
provides an analytical framework that helps identify economic factors
behind each of these patterns. The third section uses this framework to
analyze the behavior of the yield curve in the two most recent episodes
of monetary policy tightening. The final section summarizes the analy-
sis and discusses its broader implications for understanding the
relationship between the yield curve and monetary policy.
I.  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON YIELD CURVES
AND MONETARY POLICY
A brief survey of historical episodes of monetary policy tightening
supports the view that the recent behavior of long-term interest rates is
unusual but also reveals that the relationship between interest rates and
monetary policy is quite complex and changes over time. A closer look
at the historical evidence highlights three distinct patterns in this rela-
tionship and suggests the possibility of identifying a common set of
economic factors that can be used to explain historical differences in
yield curve behavior.
What happens to long-term rates when policy is tightened?
To begin, it is useful to place the recent behavior of long-term rates
in historical context. The nature of a conundrum is that it is both
unusual and difficult to explain. How unusual is it for long-term inter-
est rates to fall when monetary policy is being tightened?  One
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approach is to see what happened to long-term rates in past periods of
policy tightening. Chart 1 shows the response of long-term rates during
the first stage of policy tightening in the current cycle as compared with
eight previous periods of policy tightening over the past four decades.
The response of long-term rates is measured as the change in the yield
on the 10-year Treasury note during the first 100-basis-point increase in
the federal funds rate.
1
In the current episode, the 10-year Treasury rate fell from 4.94
percent in May 2004 to 4.36 percent in November 2004 as the federal
funds rate target was increased from 1 percent to 2 percent. According
to Chart 1, a decline in long-term rates in the initial phase of policy
tightening is highly unusual. Only in the 1977-79 period did the 10-
year Treasury rate decline as policy was tightened, and the magnitude of
the decline was considerably smaller than in the current episode.
At the same time, Chart 1 reveals that the response of long-term
rates has varied considerably over these episodes. Although the 10-year
Treasury rate increased substantially in the four episodes during the
1980s and 1990s, its response was much smaller in the 1960s and
Chart 1
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1970s. Thus, while the conundrum episode stands in stark contrast to
tightening episodes of recent years, it is much less different from the
earlier, pre-1980 periods.
The response of the yield curve to policy tightening
To get a better understanding of these differences in the behavior of
long-term rates, it is useful to take a closer look at how the entire yield
curve evolved during each of the nine tightening cycles. The behavior of
the Treasury yield curve during the most recent tightening cycle is shown
in Chart 2. This chart shows the maturity structure of the yield curve
from one to ten years at selected dates.
2 Prior to the beginning of tight-
ening, the yield curve had a steep, upward slope with longer-term rates
considerably above the federal funds rate. As shown in the chart, as the
federal funds rate rose from 1 percent in May 2004 to 3
1⁄2 percent in
August 2005, rates on short-term securities increased while long-term
rates decreased. Visually, Chart 2 suggests that short-term rates and long-
term rates appear to pivot around unchanged medium-term rates.
Chart 2


















May-04ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2005 9
To put this recent yield curve behavior in perspective, Charts 3 and
4 show how the yield curve evolved as policy was tightened in the pre-
ceding eight tightening episodes.
3 Several stylized facts emerge from a
comparison of yield curve behavior in these historical episodes. First, the
relative response of short-term and long-term rates varies greatly across
episodes. In the pre-1980 tightening episodes, short-term rates tended to
increase considerably more than long-term rates over the tightening
cycle. This feature is especially pronounced in the 1972-73 and 1977-79
periods as shown in Chart 3. In contrast, in the four post-1980 periods,
increases in short-term rates are associated with considerably larger
changes in long-term rates. The 1983-84 and 1994-95 periods shown in
Chart 4 are particularly representative of this behavior. 
Second, while long-term rates sometimes decline as short-term rates
increase, this phenomenon typically occurs toward the end of policy
tightening, rather than at the beginning of a cycle—for example, in
1987-89, 1994-95, and 1999-2000. Thus, what is particularly unusual
about the current episode is that the decline in long-term rates occurred
at the beginning of a tightening cycle rather than at the end. As indi-
cated earlier, only the 1977-79 episode shows yield curve pivoting at the
beginning of the tightening cycle, and this phenomenon is less pro-
nounced than in the current episode. 
Finally, Charts 3 and 4 suggest that, even within a tightening
episode, the response of long-term rates can vary considerably. For
example, in the 1987-89 period long-term rates rose substantially as
policy was tightened in the months before the stock market crash but
generally declined as policy was tightened in 1988 and 1989. Similarly,
in 1994-95 and 1999-2000, long-term rates increased much more at
the beginning of the tightening cycle than at the end.
Yield curve patterns
At first glance, the large differences in yield curve behavior across
tightening episodes suggest that it may be difficult to isolate the eco-
nomic factors behind these differences. However, a closer look at Charts
2, 3, and 4 shows three distinct patterns common to these episodes.
Indeed, each episode can be viewed as being made up of one or more of
these three patterns.
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May 83One distinct yield curve pattern, which was identified earlier, is piv-
oting, where short-term rates and long-term rates pivot around
unchanged medium-term rates. Pivoting is associated with a decline in
long-term rates during policy tightening. The current tightening episode
is a good example of pivoting (Chart 2).
The second pattern, rotation, appears more frequently in the histor-
ical data, especially pre-1980. Rotation describes a situation in which
short-term rates rotate around a relatively fixed long-term rate so that
the yield curve flattens and then inverts as policy is tightened. Rotation
is associated with a relatively small increase in long-term rates during
policy tightening. The 1972-73 tightening episode is a good illustration
of rotation (Chart 3). 
The third pattern, shifting, also appears frequently and is espe-
cially prominent in the first four post-1980 tightening episodes.
Shifting describes a situation in which short-, medium-, and long-
term rates move by roughly similar amounts so that the entire yield
curve shifts upward in a parallel fashion when policy is tightened.
Shifting is associated with relatively large increases in long-term rates
during policy tightening. The 1983-84 episode provides a good
example of shifting (Chart 4).
While some historical episodes are dominated by one of the three
patterns, others are a mixture of two or more patterns. For example, the
1977-79 period shows pivoting at the beginning of tightening, then
shifting, and then rotation. In contrast, the 1987-89 episode is initially
characterized by shifting and then pivoting, while the 1994-95 and
1999-2000 periods are marked by shifting in the initial stages of policy
tightening, followed by rotation and pivoting.
To the extent that yield curves are characterized by one or more of
these three patterns, we may be able to understand both the conun-
drum and historical differences in yield curve behavior by isolating
possible economic factors behind each pattern. The next section pro-
vides an analytical framework to explain how pivoting, rotation, and
shifting can originate from differing views in financial markets about
the economic outlook and monetary policy.
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II. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The model most frequently used to evaluate the interplay between
policy actions and long-term interest rates is the expectations theory of
the term structure of interest rates. This section uses the framework of
the expectations theory to identify the key economic factors that deter-
mine how the yield curve responds to monetary policy and then relates
these economic factors to the three yield curve patterns that appear in
historical tightening episodes.
Bond yields, forward rates, and expected policy
According to the expectations theory, the interest rate on any secu-
rity contains two elements:  information about financial market
expectations of monetary policy over the life of the security and a term
premium to compensate for risk. What this theory implies about near-
term versus distant expectations can be used to build a framework for
understanding how the yield curve responds to monetary policy. 
In the expectations theory, the average annual return to holding a
long-term bond is equal to the average expected return from a sequence
of investments in shorter-term bonds. For instance, the yield on a 10-
year bond can be expressed as the average return from investing in a
5-year bond today and reinvesting in a new 5-year bond that would be
purchased five years from now:
(1) 10-year yield = (1/2) (5-year yield) + 
(1/2) (5-year forward rate 5 years from now),
where the term forward rate denotes the annual return expected from
committing today to a transaction that does not take place until some
future date.
4 In this example, the 5-year forward rate five years from
now is the current expectation of the yield on a 5-year security with a
term commencing in five years time plus a term premium.
5
The expectations hypothesis provides a simple way to link mone-
tary policy actions to fluctuations of bond yields and forward rates.
Since the 10-year rate is just an average of a shorter-term rate and a
longer-horizon forward rate, the 10-year rate will change whenever
these rates change. The most important factor influencing these two
rates is likely to be investors’ views about how monetary policy will
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evolve over the next ten years (Kozicki and Tinsley 2001a). However,
policy expectations are likely to have very different effects on these two
components of the 10-year rate.
Generally speaking, short-term yields move with near-term expecta-
tions of policy, which often reflect cyclical considerations. In the early
stages of business-cycle recoveries, policy tightening is typically needed
to remove accommodation originally intended to help the economy
escape from a recession. In the late stages of business-cycle expansions,
policy tightening is generally instituted to suppress excess demand and
inflationary pressures. Thus, short-term rates will be heavily influenced
by investors’ views about how monetary policy will be used to stabilize
business cycle fluctuations.
In contrast, changes in longer-term expectations of policy that
influence distant forward rates are more likely to reflect investors’
changing views of structural features of the economy, including long-
run policy objectives.
6 This is because investors are likely to forecast
that, with appropriate monetary policy, the effects of cyclical distur-
bances will be fully dissipated after several years, bringing economic
activity back to potential and returning the federal funds rate to its
long-run equilibrium or neutral level. 
Support for this view can be found in investor surveys of expected
policy at long horizons. Chart 5 shows the expected path of the federal
funds rate target over the next ten years as reported in the Blue Chip
Financial Forecasts in May 2005. At the time of the survey, the funds
rate target was 3 percent. It was expected to rise to 4
1⁄2 percent before




It is especially important to recognize that information on investors’
perception of the inflation objective of the Federal Reserve is built into
the long-run expected policy component of distant forward rates. This
component reflects the financial market view of the neutral federal
funds rate, which equals an estimate of the equilibrium real rate plus
investors’ long-run inflation expectations. Given the long horizon of the
expectations, this inflation rate can be interpreted as the market’s view
of the Federal Reserve’s inflation objective (Kozicki and Tinsley 2001a
and 2001b).
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A second key factor influencing both near-term and longer-term
rates is a term premium. A term premium represents the extra compen-
sation for risk that an investor may require for extending the maturity
of his investment. Even when investors expect no change in future
policy, term premia may cause long-term rates to be higher than short-
term rates, giving an upward slope to the yield curve. In addition, there
is considerable evidence suggesting that term premia are time varying
and so may contribute to changes in the yield curve over time (Dai and
Singleton; Rudebusch and Wu). 
Term premia can change for several reasons. For example, institu-
tional features such as variation in the relative supply and demand for
Treasury securities may be reflected in changes in term premia. In addi-
tion, the term premium component of the forward rate may be
influenced by investors’ inflation perceptions. For instance, this compo-
nent includes compensation for inflation risk due, for example, to
uncertainty about the numerical inflation objective of policy (Cogley).
Even when investors have an unchanged estimate of the Federal
Chart 5
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Reserve’s long-run inflation objective, if the range of uncertainty around
this estimate changes, there may be a change in term premia that causes
the yield curve to change.
Understanding yield curve patterns
The framework outlined above can generate the three patterns that
characterize yield curve responses to policy tightening. In all three pat-
terns—rotation, shifting, and pivoting—expectations of tighter policy
shift the short end of the yield curve upward. The patterns primarily
differ because longer-horizon forward rates may shift up or down
depending on the direction of revisions to longer-term perspectives.
These diverging movements reflect different adjustments to perceived
policy objectives for inflation, financial markets estimates of the long-
run equilibrium real interest rate, or term premia.
To see how these yield curve patterns can be obtained from the
expectations theory, it is useful to look at some simple numerical exam-
ples. In Table 1, the federal funds rate initially is expected to rise from an
average level of 2 percent in the first year to 4.5 percent in the third year.
The panels illustrate different outcomes one year later: Panel A shows
rotation; Panel B, parallel shift; and Panel C, pivoting. Charts 6, 7, and
8 illustrate how the yield curve changes in each of the three examples.
Yield curve rotations occur when shorter-maturity yields shift up by
more than longer-term yields. One way this pattern can be generated is
by changes in current rates and near-term forward rates that push up
short-term yields but with little or no accompanying change in distant
forward rates. In this situation, the long-term rate rises much less than
the short-term rate because it is an average of the short-term rate and the
unchanged forward rate. A second way rotation could occur is when a
relatively large increase in short-term rates is offset by a decline in distant
forward rates. Because the long-term rate is an average of short-term
rates and distant forward rates, it shows little change. 
The example summarized in Chart 6 and Panel A illustrates the
first type of rotation. After one year, the federal funds rate has risen
from an average level of 2 percent to an average level of 3.5 percent.
However, estimates of the neutral federal funds rate are not revised and
remain at 4.5 percent. Term premia are also assumed to remain con-
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stant. As a result, the 5-year forward rate is unchanged at 5.6 percent.
9
Such stability at the long end may reflect unchanged market expecta-
tions of the long-run equilibrium real rate in combination with
well-anchored inflation expectations. The latter outcome might be
expected to occur when near-term changes in monetary policy are
viewed as consistent with views of the inflation goal of monetary policy
embedded in distant forward rates. In other words, throughout the
policy tightening, financial markets do not revise their opinions about
what inflation will be in the long run. Alternatively, an unchanged
forward rate could also result from equal but opposite movements in
policy expectations and the term premium.
Table 1
EXAMPLES OF YIELD CURVE PATTERNS WITH 
POLICY TIGHTENING
Year
123456 - 1 0
Initial
Average exp policy 2.0 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Term premium .0 .1 .2 .5 .7 1.1
Forward rate 2.0 3.6 4.7 5.0 5.2 5.6
Yield 2.0 2.8 3.4 3.8 4.1 4.9
One year later
Panel a: Rotation
Average exp policy 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Term premium .0 .1 .2 .5 .7 1.1
Forward rate 3.5 4.6 4.7 5.0 5.2 5.6
Yield 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.6 5.1
Panel b: Shift
Average exp policy 3.0 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Term premium .0 .1 .2 .5 .7 1.1
Forward rate 3.0 4.6 5.2 6.0 6.2 6.6
Yield 3.0 3.8 4.3 4.7 5.0 5.8
Panel c: Pivot
Average exp policy 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Term premium .0 .1 .1 .2 .3 .3
Forward rate 3.5 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3
Yield 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.2
Note: Entries are rounded.
Entries apply to the period in the column label. Thus, for example, forward rates are one-year for-
ward rates in columns labeled 1, … 5, and 5-year forward rates in the column labeled 6-10. In the
year 1 column, the forward rate entry is equal to the one-year yield. In the year 2 column, the for-
ward rate is the one-year forward rate one year from now. Yields are 1-, … 5-year yields in columns
labeled 1, … 5 and 10-year yields in the column labeled 6-10.18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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Parallel shifts in the yield curve occur when yields of all maturities
increase by roughly the same amount (Chart 7 and Panel B). Thus, for
instance, changes in the 5-year forward rate are about the same as
changes in short-term bond yields. Parallel shifts can occur when the
neutral rate increases at the same time that policy is tightened.
10  Neutral
rate shifts may be largely unrelated to policy tightening, as when market
expectations of the long-run equilibrium real rate are revised up,
perhaps because of a perceived increase in trend productivity growth.
Of course, even as policy is tightened, upward adjustments in market
perceptions of inflation may occur when anticipated policy actions are
not viewed as sufficient to keep inflation under control. Episodes with
parallel upward shifts in yield curves that are driven by rising inflation
fears have sometimes been referred to as inflation scares (Goodfriend).
In Chart 7 and Panel B, the 5-year forward rate increases from 5.6 to
6.6 percent with a one-percentage-point increase in the neutral rate. 
Pivoting in the yield curve occurs when near-term and longer-term
expectations are revised in opposite directions—as happens when
tighter policy is accompanied by a decreasing distant forward rate
(Chart 8 and Panel C). Two scenarios are most likely to lead to this
unusual outcome. One possibility is that tighter policy leads to lower
distant forward rates. This may occur if tighter monetary policy leads to
a revision in perceptions of the inflation objective of policy. Tighter
than expected monetary policy could lead financial market participants
to lower their estimate of the implicit inflation target of monetary
policy, which, in turn, would lead to a lower neutral federal funds rate
(Kozicki and Tinsley 2005). Alternatively, the tighter policy might lead
to a perceived increase in the resolve of the central bank to achieve its
inflation objective, to decreased uncertainty about long-run inflation,
and consequently to a decline in an inflation risk component of the
term premium. 
A second possibility is that distant forward rates may decline for
reasons unrelated to the policy tightening. As noted earlier, a perceived
decrease in trend productivity growth could lead to lower market expec-
tations of the long-run equilibrium real rate and a lower neutral federal
funds rate. In addition, the term premium could decrease with an
increase in the relative demand for long-term bonds through events that
are largely unconnected with policy tightening. In the example shown
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Chart 8
A PIVIOTING YIELD CURVE
in Panel C, the yield curve pivots because, although policy tightening
leads to a rise in short-term rates, the 5-year forward rate declines with
a smaller term premium and a lower neutral rate.
III. EXPLAINING THE YIELD CURVE RESPONSE TO
POLICY TIGHTENING
The preceding section showed how changes in long-horizon
forward rates can generate historical patterns in the yield curve and
identified some of the economic factors that might lie behind these pat-
terns. This section attempts to quantify the relative influence of these
economic factors in the two most recent episodes of Federal Reserve
policy tightening.
Relating economic factors to forward rates
To apply the analytical framework developed in the previous
section, it is necessary to formalize some of the relationships discussed
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key relationship connects forward rates to market estimates of the
neutral federal funds rate. By combining the expectations theory of the
term structure with the insight that long-horizon forward rates should
be free of short-term cyclical and policy influences, a distant forward
rate can be expressed as the sum of the neutral federal funds rate and a
term premium:
(2) Forward Rate  =  Neutral Rate + Term Premium. 
The neutral rate can, in turn, be broken into real rate and expected
inflation components:
(3) Neutral Rate  =  Long-Run Equilibrium Real Rate + Long-run 
Expected Inflation. 
And, the term premium can be split into an inflation risk premium
and other risk premium components:
(4) Term Premium = Long-Run Inflation Risk Premium + Other 
Risk Premium. 
Combining these relationships, the forward rate can be expressed as
the sum of the real rate, expected inflation, and the two risk premia:
(5) Forward Rate = Real Rate + Expected Inflation + Inflation Risk 
Premium + Other Risk Premium.
In this framework, changes in the forward rate can originate from
changes in each of the four explanatory factors. 
To use this framework for empirical analysis, interest rate data and
financial market survey data are combined to calculate the contribution
of each factor to changes in the forward rate. The forward rate used in
the empirical analysis is the 5-year forward rate discussed in Section I.
This rate is calculated from the zero coupon Treasury yield curve using
Equation 1. For this article, survey data from the Blue Chip Financial
Forecasts are used to measure the neutral federal funds rate and long-run
expected inflation. The neutral rate is the survey measure of the
expected federal funds rate at a horizon of six to ten years in the future.
Similarly, the long-run expected inflation rate is the Blue Chip survey
measure of the expected CPI inflation rate at a horizon of six to ten
years ahead.
11 
To separate the term premium into its two components, informa-
tion from the Treasury Inflation Protection Securities (TIPS) market is
used to compute a measure of long-run inflation compensation at a
horizon of six to ten years ahead.
12 This measure is calculated as the dif-
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ference between the 5-year forward rate derived from the zero coupon
Treasury yield curve and the 5-year forward rate derived from the TIPS
yield curve. Inflation compensation contains long-run expected infla-
tion and an inflation risk premium:
(6) Long-Run Inflation Compensation = Expected Inflation + 
Inflation Risk Premium.
By subtracting the survey measure of long-run expected inflation from
this estimate of inflation compensation, an estimate of the inflation risk
premium can be obtained. The other risk premium can then be calcu-
lated as a residual using Equation 5. Because the Blue Chip survey data
and the TIPS data are only available from 1997, the empirical analysis
is restricted to the two most recent episodes of Federal Reserve tighten-
ing: 1999-2000 and 2004-05.
The 1999-2000 tightening episode
After easing policy in the fall of 1998, in the midst of the financial
market turmoil associated with the Russian debt default, the Federal
Reserve began to remove the policy accommodation in June 1999.
From June 1999 to May 2000, the federal funds rate target was raised
from 4.75 percent to 6.5 percent. To analyze the response of the yield
curve to policy tightening, it is useful to divide the entire period into
two parts: from May 1999, the month prior to the beginning of tight-
ening, to November 1999; and from November 1999 to May 2000.
13
The behavior of the yield curve is very different during the two sub-
periods (Chart 9). During the first subperiod, the yield curve exhibits a
nearly parallel upward shift. In contrast, the second subperiod is charac-
terized by rotation. The behavior of the term structure in the two
periods is shown in Table 2a. During the first subperiod, the 0.75-per-
centage-point increase in the funds rate target is associated with large
increases in the 5-year rate and the 5-year forward rate, contributing
equally to the rise in the 10-year rate. In contrast, during the second
subperiod, the 1 percent increase in the funds target is associated with a
sizable increase in the 5-year rate and an unchanged forward rate,
resulting in a much smaller increase in the 10-year rate.
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A variety of economic factors appear to be behind the yield curve
behavior in the two periods. Using the framework set out above, Table
2b attempts to identify the key factors in each subperiod. From May
1999 to November 1999, there was a large increase in the estimate of
the neutral funds rate, driven primarily by an increase in the market’s
perception of the equilibrium real rate. Inflation compensation (the
sum of expected inflation and the inflation risk premium) also increased
considerably.
14 Overall, the large increase in the 5-year forward rate
during this subperiod appears to reflect both a large increase in the
equilibrium real rate and a minor inflation scare.
The factors behind the rotation shown in the second subperiod are
very different. During this time, there was little change in inflation
compensation. There was, however, an increase in the perceived equilib-
rium real rate that was twice the size of the increase in the first
subperiod. The forward rate was essentially unchanged, though, because
of a very large offsetting reduction in the other risk component of the
term premium.
While these empirical estimates are likely to be imprecise, they
appear generally consistent with descriptions of the economy during
this time. The very large increase in the market’s estimate of the equilib-
Chart 9
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Table 2b
CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGES IN FORWARD RATES
BEHAVIOR OF YIELD CURVE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Period Target 5yr 10yr For5yr Expected Inflation  Neutral 
Inflation Compensation Rate
Change
May 99  + .75 + .53 + .50 + .47 + .10 + .24 + .40
to Nov 99
Change
Nov 99  + 1.0 + .59 + .27 - .05 + .10 - .05 + .80
to May 00




Source: Blue Chip Financial Forecasts; Federal Reserve Board; Authors’ calculations
Note: Entries are changes over the indicated period, expressed in percentage points.
The real-rate change is calculated as the difference between the change in the neutral rate and the
change in expected inflation. The change in inflation risk is calculated as the difference between the
change in inflation compensation and the change in expected inflation. The change in other risk is
calculated as the difference between the change in the 5-year ahead 5-year forward rate and the sum
of the changes in the neutral rate and inflation risk.
Table 2a
YIELD CURVE BEHAVIOR 1999-2000
rium real rate may reflect a response to discussions by Federal Reserve
policymakers suggesting that the surge in productivity growth indicated
the need to raise estimates of the neutral rate (Meyer). Similarly, the
large change in the other risk premium is consistent with an increased
demand for long-term government securities in an environment in
which the Treasury was beginning a buyback program due to a rising
fiscal surplus.
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Taken as a whole, the sizable increase in long-term rates during
1999-2000 appears to have been driven primarily by a higher estimate of
the equilibrium real rate, which substantially raised financial market esti-
mates of the neutral rate. This increase probably would have been even
larger in the absence of special factors in the Treasury market that led to
an increased demand for long-term Treasury securities. Notably, much of
the rise in inflation risk during the first subperiod was unwound in the
second subperiod, so that inflation concerns played only a small role in
the overall behavior of long-term rates during this period.
The 2004-05 tightening episode
The most recent tightening episode shows a very different response
of financial markets to monetary policy. After an extended period of
accommodative monetary policy that began in January 2001, the
Federal Reserve began to raise the federal funds rate target in June 2004.
From June 2004 to August 2005, the FOMC raised the target from 1
percent to 3.5 percent. Unlike the 1999-2000 period, however, long-
term rates fell instead of rising as the funds rate target increased. 
As in the previous episode, it is useful to divide the whole period
into two subperiods: from May 2004, the month before tightening
began, to September 2004; and from September 2004 to August
2005. The reason for this decomposition is that, while long-term rates
in August 2005 remained below their levels in May 2004, most of the
decline in long-term rates occurred in the first subperiod. In fact,
long-term rates, while volatile, showed little net change during the
second subperiod.
The yield curve exhibits two distinct patterns in the two subperiods
(Chart 10). During the first subperiod, the yield curve shows pivoting.
Even as the federal funds rate target was increased, rates beyond one to
two years declined. In the second subperiod, the yield curve shows rota-
tion. While short-term and medium-term rates rose considerably,
longer-term rates showed little change.
The behavior of key interest rates is highlighted in Table 3a.
During the first subperiod, a 0.75-percentage-point increase in the
funds rate target was associated with large decreases in the 5-year rate,
the 5-year forward rate, and the 10-year rate. In contrast, during the
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second subperiod, the 1.75-percentage-point increase in the funds
target was associated with a relatively large increase in the 5-year rate
and an offsetting decline in the 5-year forward rate, leaving the 10-
year rate unchanged.
The economic factors behind these yield curve patterns are sum-
marized in Table 3b.
16 During both subperiods, in sharp contrast to the
1999-2000 episode, financial market perceptions of the neutral federal
funds rate were unchanged. The estimated neutral rate remained near
4.25 percent throughout. Moreover, neither the underlying equilib-
rium real rate nor long-term inflation expectations appear to have
changed. Thus, the main factors responsible for yield curve shifting in
1999-2000 were absent in this period. Indeed, the large decline in the
5-year forward rate in each subperiod was driven entirely by changes in
the term premium. As indicated in Table 2b, about half of the decline
in the total term premium in each subperiod was due to lower esti-
























 BEHAVIOR OF YIELD CURVE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Period Target 5yr 10yr For5yr Expected Inflation Inflation Neutral Rate
Change
May 04 +.75 -.52 -.62 -.73 0.0 -.35 0.0
to Sept 04
Change 
Sept 04 +1.75 +.72 0.0 -.72 +.10 -.30 0.0
to Aug 05
Table 3b
CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGES IN FORWARD RATES
Taking a closer look at the behavior of the two risk components of
the term premium, the sizable drop in the inflation risk component
appears to largely reflect an unwinding of a buildup of inflation con-
cerns that occurred prior to the beginning of policy tightening (Chart
11). The large decline in the other risk component remains puzzling.
Unlike the 1999-2000 episode where the fall in the term premium can
plausibly be linked to the perceived effects of debt buybacks on the
Treasury market, in this episode there is not an obvious explanation for
why there should be an increased demand for long-term securities by
investors.
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5-year forward rate -.73 -.72
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Although an unexplained drop in the term premium appears to lie
behind the recent interest rate conundrum, it should be stressed that
the behavior of the term premium does not account for why this
episode differs so greatly from the 1999-2000 tightening episode. As
shown in the preceding subsection, a declining term premium also
played an important part in the 1999-2000 period. In fact, the key dif-
ference is that the neutral rate was unchanged as the funds rate target
was increased in the current episode. By contrast, a large increase in the
market’s estimate of the neutral rate appears to be the principal factor
responsible for the rise in long-term rates in 1999-2000.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article was motivated by the recent decline in long-term rates
in the midst of Federal Reserve tightening, the so-called interest rate
conundrum. While the recent behavior of long-term rates is certainly
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constitutes normal behavior. Indeed, what is particularly striking about
the connection between long-term rates and monetary policy is how
variable this relationship has been over time. 
Despite the complexity of this relationship, however, common pat-
terns emerge from the historical data. This article provides a simple
analytical framework that helps understand these patterns and the eco-
nomic forces behind them. In this framework, the behavior of
long-horizon forward rates is crucial to understanding the relationship
between long-term rates and monetary policy.
This framework is used to analyze the factors behind the interest
rate conundrum and to compare the recent experience with the 1999-
2000 period of monetary policy tightening. The analysis suggests that
the key factor behind the conundrum is a large reduction in the term
premium. Approximately half of the decline in the premium can be
attributed to an unwinding of an inflation risk premium; the other half
remains unexplained. In comparing the conundrum period to the
1999-2000 period, however, the key difference is not the behavior of
the term premium but, rather, the behavior of financial market esti-
mates of the neutral federal funds rate. In 1999-2000, a very large
increase in the neutral rate offset a decline in the term premium causing
long-term rates to rise as policy tightened. In contrast, in the more
recent period, market estimates of the neutral rate did not change and
so did not provide an offset to the declining term premium.
The analysis in the article also has broader implications for thinking
about the relationship between the yield curve and monetary policy.
Many discussions of the behavior of long-term rates focus almost exclu-
sively on the importance of inflationary expectations in the
determination of long-term rates. This article suggests that other factors
are important as well and, moreover, that the relative importance of
inflation expectations and other economic and financial factors has
changed over time. The analysis also suggests caution in interpreting
yield curve changes as a harbinger of future economic activity. Recently,
some have suggested that the combination of rising short-term rates
and falling long-term rates may be a signal of near-term economic
weakness. As shown in this article, however, the recent behavior of long-
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term rates has been driven primarily by lower long-horizon forward
rates, which are unlikely to reflect short-term business cycle considera-
tions.
Finally, the analysis provides some insight for how the yield curve
might behave going forward. The U.S. economy has achieved a remark-
able degree of price stability in recent years. To the extent that financial
markets believe that the Federal Reserve will act to maintain this envi-
ronment, inflation concerns are likely to be less important than they
have been historically. In this event, long-term rates are likely to be less
volatile in future periods of monetary policy tightening. At the same
time, however, the importance of term premia in recent yield curve
behavior suggests there is still much to be learned about the relationship
between long-term interest rates and monetary policy.
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ENDNOTES
1The response is measured from the month prior to the first policy action to
the month in which the federal funds rate target was 100 basis points higher than
its initial level. All rates are from the zero-coupon Treasury yield curve.
2Looking at the left side of the chart, the lowest line shows the yield curve in
the month before policy tightening began when the federal funds rate target was
1 percent. The higher lines show how the yield curve evolved as the federal funds
rate target was increased. 
3Each chart shows the evolution of the Treasury yield curve from the month
before policy tightening began to the month of the last increase in the federal
funds rate. To make the charts easier to read, only selected dates are included,
generally corresponding to major changes in the level of the federal funds rate.
Because the federal funds market was not fully developed until the late 1960s, the
3-month Treasury bill rate is used instead of the federal funds rate as the index for
policy changes for the two tightening episodes in the 1960s.
4While bond yields are reported directly in the financial press, forward rates
are not. However, the same theory that relates bond rates to forward rates can be
used to solve for forward rates from bond rates. Translating bond yield data into
implied forward rates assists in determining the relative role of shifts in near-term
versus distant expectations in explaining movements in yields.
5For simplicity, the 5-year forward rate 5 years from now will be referred to
as the 5-year forward rate in the remainder of this article.
6Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson provide evidence that private agents’ views
of long-run inflation are not strongly anchored.
7The information in this chart is from the June 2005 issue of the Blue Chip
Financial Forecast, which reports results from a survey taken in late May 2005.
The chart combines short-run forecasts out to the next five quarters, which are
available monthly, with longer-horizon forecasts which are only taken in May and
November. The longer horizon forecasts are only available from 1997.
8To be sure, the average inflation rate expected 5 to 10 years in the future
might only be interpretable as an intermediate-run objective. Historically, if poli-
cymakers were following an opportunistic approach to disinflation, then market
participants might admit to the potential for future declines in inflation at some
unspecified horizon—but, after the next recession (Orphanides and Wilcox).
9The 5-year forward rate five years from now is equal to the sum of the fed-
eral funds rate expected to obtain over the 5 years starting 5 years from now and
the average term premium over those latter 5 years. As shown in the chart, the
average federal funds rate and term premium are expected to be 4.5 percent and
1.1 percent, respectively.
10Changes in term premia are unlikely to lead to a parallel upward shift in the
yield curve. The similarly-sized changes in term premia at many horizons that
would be necessary for a parallel upward shift would be implausible because term
premia are generally smaller for shorter horizons.
11Both surveys are only made twice a year, generally in May and November
and are reported in the June and December Blue Chip Financial Forecasts.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2005 32
12To the extent that the TIPS market is not as liquid as the market for nom-
inal Treasury securities, the estimate of inflation compensation may be distorted
by a liquidity risk premium. For a further discussion see: Shen and Corning and
Carlstrom and Fuerst.
13The justification for this split is two-fold. By November 1999, the Federal
Reserve had increased the funds rate target by .75 percentage point, completely
unwinding the additional accommodation provided during 1998. The later
increase in the target represented additional tightening. In addition, the year-end
1999 period was accompanied by unique actions by the Federal Reserve in man-
aging liquidity during the century date change. An alternative approach would be
to omit the period from November 1999 to January 2000 and begin with the
next policy action in February 2000. In this event, the February 2000 to May
2000 period would exhibit pivoting partly resulting from the unwinding of a
large increase in long-term rates and long-horizon forward rates that occurred in
January 2000.
14The level of inflation compensation and the calculation of the inflation risk
premium are likely distorted by a liquidity risk premium in TIPS yields. The
effect of this distortion is likely to be smaller by looking at first differences.
15The announcement of the debt buyback program was made on January 13,
2000.
16Because the Blue Chip survey data are only available for May and Novem-
ber, the November 2004 survey is used to calculate the September 2004 decom-
position and the May 2005 survey is used to calculate the August 2005
decomposition.
17Other researchers have noted this behavior of term premia ( Macroeco-
nomic Advisors, Kim and Wright). Estimates of the breakdown of the total term
premium into its components may differ somewhat among studies because of dif-
ferent sample periods and methods of estimation.
18There is some empirical evidence connecting foreign investment flows into
the U.S. with the decline in long-term rates although the reason for these flows
remains unclear (Warnock and Warnock). Others have suggested that foreign
official purchases related to exchange rate objectives or increased demand by pen-
sions funds may also have contributed to the decline in the other risk premium.
19It is interesting to note that the yield curve exhibited very different behav-
ior in the two subperiods even though the 5-year forward rate declined by a sim-
ilar amount. The difference reflects the behavior of short and medium-term rates.
In the first subperiod, the 5-year rate declined substantially while, in the second
subperiod it rose. The decline in the 5-year rate appears to reflect a lower term
premium as policy expectations did not change much during this period. The rise
in the 5-year rate in the second subperiod appears to reflect the actual tightening
that occurred plus higher inflation compensation.33 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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